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1 Introduction
In a classic paper, Hirshleifer (1971) noted that innovations may a¤ect the equilibrium
prices of various assets that are traded in the economy. He argued that inventors are
better informed than anybody else on the arrival of their own innovation, concluding
that they can reap speculative prots by exploiting this inside information. These
speculative prots may provide a reward for inventors even in the absence of any
other appropriation mechanism, such as patents or secrecy.
To illustrate this possibility, Hirshleifer used the example of Ely Whitney, the
inventor of the cotton gin:
[t]he cotton gin had obvious speculative implications for the price of cotton, the
value of slaves and of cotton-bearing land, the site value of key points in the
transport network that sprang up. There were also predictable implications for
competitor industries (wool) and complementary ones (textiles, machinery). It
seems very likely that some forethoughted individuals reaped speculative gains
on these developments, though apparently Whitney did not. And yet, he was the
rst in the know, the possessor of an unparalleled opportunity for speculative
prot. (p.571)
Other examples of innovations a¤ecting asset prices readily come to mind: think
for instance of the e¤ect of the invention of the combustion engine on the price of oil,
or that of microchips on silicon. The secretive nature of insider trading makes it hard
to nd direct evidence of speculative activity carried out by innovators. However,
some indirect evidence can be found, for instance, in Helfats (1997) study on the
direction of US oil rmsR&D projects after the oil shocks.1
In this paper, we formalize Hirshleifers argument by developing a tractable model
of endogenous growth in which the reward to inventive activity is constituted by Hish-
1 In particular, Helfat (1997) reports that certain rms accumulated stocks of coal as a consequence
of their intensied R&D e¤ort on coal technology (p. 345).
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leiferian speculative gains rather than, or in addition to, Schumpeterian monopoly
rents. We then use the model to assess certain claims made by Hirshleifer, which are
still echoed in the policy debate on innovation and intellectual property.
Hirshleifer recognized that inventors can capture only a fraction of the pecuniary
e¤ects of innovations. The size of this fraction depends on the extent to which inside
information can be exploited without being revealed. In a noiseless economy, for
instance, under quite general conditions the fraction would vanish, as any inside
information would be perfectly revealed as soon as its possessor tried to exploit it
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). However, a vast literature on insider trading, starting
with Kyle (1985), has argued that in the presence of noise traders the insiders can
obtain positive prots by hiding behind their trades.
While this literature has shown that insider trading can be an equilibrium phe-
nomenon, it is not the aim of this paper to incorporate a fully microfounded model
of insider trading into an endogenous growth framework. Rather, we simply take the
fraction of the potential speculative gains that the inventor actually captures as ex-
ogenous. This reduced-form approach sidesteps many important problems related to
the functioning of nancial markets, but allows us to address other interesting ques-
tions, which are often discussed in the intellectual property debate (see e.g. Boldrin
and Levine, 2008) and also in the long standing legal debate on insider trading and
disclosure law (see e.g. Manne, 1966 and Duggan, 1995),2 and yet have not been
analyzed in formal economic models so far.
The rst question is whether speculative prots alone may sustain persistent in-
novation and growth; whether they o¤er, to use Hirshleifers words, an appropriate
inducement to invention.Our analysis shows that they may, provided that the frac-
tion of the pecuniary e¤ects of innovations that inventors obtain exceeds a minimum
2The legal debate originates from Mannes (1966) provocative book against the legal ban on
insider trading. The argument that insider trading constitutes an appropriate way of compensating
innovators stands as a central proposition of the book: Insider trading meets all the conditions for
appropriately compensating entrepreneurs. It readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their
innovations. . . . .[T]his is not a direct marketing of the idea, but rather a saleof information about
an innovation(p. 138). For an extensive review of this debate see, for instance, Bewaji (2012).
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threshold. This threshold can be computed analytically and depends on parame-
ters that can be assessed empirically. After solving the model, we o¤er a tentative,
preliminary assessment which may help to get a sense of the practical relevance of
Hirshleifers mechanism.
The second question that we address is the theoretical possibility that speculative
prots can create an excessive incentive to invest in research. There are two versions
of this claim, both advanced by Hirshleifer. The rst is that speculative prots alone
can be so large as to exceed the social value of innovations. This claim is based on
the observation that:
there is no logically necessary tie between the size of the technological benet
on the one hand, and the amplitude of the price shifts that create speculative
opportunities on the other. [...] A relatively minor shift in locomotive technology,
for example, might lead railroad planners to select an entirely di¤erent route for
a new line, with drastic upward and downward shifts of land values. (p. 572)
The second version maintains that overinvestment in R&D can occur when the inno-
vator obtains monopoly rents in addition to speculative prots. In other words, the
two versions of the claim are that speculative prots may overcompensate inventors
even under perfect competition, or else only in the presence of market power.
Our analysis cast doubts on the rst claim: in our model, speculative prots can
never overcompensate inventors in the absence of monopoly rents. This is true even
if inventors capture the pecuniary e¤ects of their innovations fully. The intuitive
reason for this is that, contrary to what Hirshleifer argued, there does exist a relation
between speculative opportunities and the size of innovations. To use Hirshleifers
example, if a minor shift in locomotive technology induces railroad planners to select
an alternative route, then the two routes must be close substitutes both before and
after the shift. If this is so, however, then changes in land value cannot be ample.
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To be more precise, in our model tradeable assets appreciate only to the extent
that innovations increase their productivity. This poses an upper bound on the size
of the speculative gains. The upper bound is always lower than the social value of
innovations, as the latter is given by the total increase in factor productivity and
thus includes also the increase in the productivity of labour. However, the increase in
labour productivity cannot be captured by speculators as claims on labour resources
cannot be traded in legal markets due to laws against indentured servitude.
We then modify the perfectly competitive growth model to provide an assessment
of the second version of the claim, i.e. that speculative prots may create overinvest-
ment in R&D in the presence of patent protection and monopoly rents. We develop a
model where patent protection cannot lead to overinvestment in R&D by itself. The
question then is whether inventors can be overcompensated by cumulating specula-
tive prots and monopoly rents. The answer is not obvious, as patent protection in
fact crowds out speculative gains. For example, if perfectly protected patent holders
could capture, by means of monopoly rents, all of the value of the innovation, then
asset prices would not change at all as innovations arrive, and thus the opportunity
for speculation would vanish. Therefore, overinvestment in R&D cannot occur when
patent protection is perfect; nor, as we have just seen, when it is totally absent. How-
ever, we show that overinvestment may indeed arise for intermediate levels of patent
protection. This validates the second, weaker version of Hirshleifers claim.
Literature. Other papers have argued that innovation can be sustained in a per-
fectly competitive economy with no monopoly rents. Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and
Bester and Petrakis (2003) show that persistent innovation can be driven by the infra-
marginal rents obtained by competitive rms in the short run. A similar mechanism
has been proposed in a series of papers by Boldrin and Levine (see e.g. Boldrin and
Levine 2004, 2008), who argue that innovators can prot by selling the rst copy
of their ideas. A common feature of these models is that innovative technological
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knowledge cannot be immediately used by rms other than the inventor, even in the
absence of patent protection. In this sense, these models depart from the traditional
assumption that innovative technological knowledge is non rival (Arrow, 1962). The
mechanism proposed by Hirshleifer, in contrast, is fully consistent with that assump-
tion. In fact, the swifter and the wider is the adoption of the new technology, the
greater are changes in asset prices and hence the potential for speculative gains.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we present the basic model. Section 3 derives the model equilibrium and provides
conditions for sustained growth to be supported by speculative prots alone. The
two versions of the over-investment hypothesis, without and with patent protection,
are analyzed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 summarizes the paper and
o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The baseline model
In this section, we develop a stylized general equilibrium model of endogenous growth,
adapted from Acemoglu (2009). In the model, innovations a¤ect the price of a pro-
ductive asset, thereby creating an opportunity for speculative prots.
The economy is populated by identical, innitely-lived households whose mass is
normalized to one. There is a unique nal good, which can be consumed or used in
research. This good is taken as the numeraire. Households have additive logarithmic
intertemporal preferences over consumption ows c(t):
u(c) =
Z 1
0
ln [c(t)] e tdt; (1)
where  is the rate of time preference.3 Time is continuous and is denoted by t, but
to simplify the notation we shall often suppress the time index.
3One can easily allow for more general preferences, such as for instance
u(c) =
Z 1
0

c(t)1    1
1  

e tdt;
where 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
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The nal good is produced in a continuum of perfectly competitive industries
indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. Since Grossman and Helpman (1991), the assumption of a
continuum of industries has become standard in the endogenous growth literature.
It guarantees that even though in each industry ! the arrival of new innovations
is stochastic, by the law of large numbers there is no aggregate uncertainty. In
other words, uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic and can be diversied away perfectly,
implying that asset pricing is not a¤ected by considerations of risk.
Each industry ! produces the same nal good y, but using di¤erent, industry-
specic, inputs: labour L! and an irreproducible tradeable asset T!. The assumption
that the tradeable asset (e.g., land) is irreproducible simplies the analysis allowing
us to abstract from issues of capital accumulation. The production function is taken
to be:4
y! = 
k(!)L!T
1 
! with  > 1 and 0 <  < 1;
where  is the income share of labour, and k(!) is total factor productivity if k(!)
innovations have occurred. That is, each innovation increases total factor productivity
by a factor  > 1. Summing over industries, one obtains the aggregate production
function:
y =
1Z
0
k(!)L!T
1 
! d! (2)
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labour and one unit of the irre-
producible asset in each industry. Thus, we have L! = 1 and T! = 1, which implies
that at each point in time output equals total factor productivity:
y =
1Z
0
k(!)d!:
As mentioned above, technology improves over time as a result of innovative
activity. We refer to period k(!)as the random time interval between innovation
k(!) and innovation k(!)+1 in industry !. (For notational simplicity, we henceforth
4The Cobb-Douglas specication simplies the calculations but is not crucial to our results.
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drop the industry index ! when this does not create any confusion.) We set k = 0 at
time zero in all industries, thereby normalizing total factor productivity at time zero
to 1.
In each industry ! and each period k, there is a free-entry race for innovation
k+1. The race starts as soon as innovation k is achieved and disclosed. A number of
symmetric risk-neutral rms can participate in this race by investing the nal good
in independent R&D projects. We assume that there are constant returns to R&D
with no R&D spillovers. This rules out congestion e¤ects and negative or positive
externalities in the research process. As is well known, these e¤ects by themselves
can cause over or underinvestment in R&D.5 Ruling them out allows us to focus on
speculative prots as the possible cause of overinvestment.
Each research rm i chooses its R&D investment ni;k to obtain the k + 1-th
innovation. The R&D investment is a ow cost paid until the innovation is achieved.
The R&D investment produces an instantaneous probability of success of kni;k,
where k > 0 is the productivity of R&D. Since projects are independent, the arrival
of innovation k+1 follows a Poisson stochastic process with a hazard rate xk = knk,
where nk =
P
i ni;k denotes aggregate R&D investment.
6 To guarantee the existence
of a steady state, we assume that k =  k, where  is a parameter that measures
the productivity of R&D.7
The rate of growth of the economy is:
_y
y
=
1R
0
h
k(!)+1   k(!;t)
i
xd!
1R
0
k(!)d!
= (   1)x;
and therefore is not stochastic.
5For a discussion of the possible sources of overinvestment in R&D in endogenous growth models
see Denicolò and Zanchettin (2014).
6Firms can adjust their R&D e¤orts at any point in time, but with a Poisson discovery process
they all will choose a constant level of R&D expenditure until someone succeeds, and the next race
starts.
7 In a steady state, the hazard rate xk, and hence the expected duration of time periods, must be
constant. Since R&D investment nk must grow at rate  from one period to the next, k must decline
at rate . This explains the knife-edge assumption k =  k, which is common to all R&D-driven
endogenous growth models (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 7).
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3 Speculation and growth
We now determine the equilibrium of the economy under the assumption that markets
are perfectly competitive and there is no patent protection (or secrecy). That is, all
rms active in the product market may freely use the leading technology. Innovators
are rewarded by speculative prots only. The question is whether these may su¢ ce
to sustain steady innovation and growth.
3.1 Equilibrium prices
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Since rms can freely use the leading
technology, the wage rate in period k is wk = k. The income share of labour is .
The remaining share represents the rents accruing to the owners of the irreproducible
asset, Rk = (1  )k:
The expected ow return to holding the asset is the sum of the rents Rk and
any expected capital gain due to the arrival of innovation k + 1. Let Pk denote
the price of the irreproducible asset in period k. With complete information, when
innovation k + 1 arrives the price would jump to Pk+1 and stay constant until the
next innovation.8 However, the timing of the innovation is uncertain. The innovator,
being the rst in the know, has for a time inside information as to the arrival of the
innovation. Thus, he can anticipate the market and obtain speculative prots. This
reduces, conversely, the capital gain that can be obtained by outside investors.
As mentioned in the introduction, here we do not model insider trading explicitly.9
Rather, we simply assume that, by exploiting his superior information, the innovator
captures a share  of the change in the total value of the asset, Pk+1  Pk (which we
also refer to as the pecuniary e¤ects of the innovation). We take  as a parameter
8Price increases are permanent when the asset is irreproducible. If the asset was reproducible,
by contrast, any increase in its price would stimulate the accumulation of the asset until the price
falls back to the asset production cost. The anticipation of this adjustment process would dampen
changes in asset prices when innovations occur.
9At the end of this section, we briey discuss some of the problems of explicitly modeling insider
trading.
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that ranges in between 0 and 1,10 its size being ultimately an empirical question. We
assume that the speculative process is instantaneous.11
Uninformed investors anticipate that when the next innovation arrives they will
obtain only a fraction (1 ) of the change in the value of the asset, as the remaining
fraction  is reaped by the inventor. This implies that their expected ow capital gain
is xk(1   )(Pk+1   Pk). This adds to the rents Rk, determining the total expected
return from holding the asset.
Investors can perfectly diversify away risk by investing in di¤erent industries, so
in equilibrium the expected return must equal the interest rate r. The asset pricing
equilibrium condition then is:
rPk = Rk + xk(1  )(Pk+1   Pk):
In a steady state, the rate of arrival of innovations xk is constant across periods,
and the asset price Pk grows by a factor  from one period to the next. Writing Pk =
kp; where p is the growth-adjusted asset price, the asset price equation becomes:
rp = (1  ) + x(1  )(   1)p: (3)
3.2 Equilibrium R&D investment
Consider now the equilibrium in innovation races. The prize to the winner of the
k + 1-th race is the speculative prot k =  (Pk+1   Pk) : Since the instantaneous
probability of success of a generic rm i that invests ni;k units of the nal good
in that race is kni;k, the rms expected ow revenue is kni;kk. On the other
hand, its ow R&D cost is ni;k. Because there is free entry, the zero-prot condition
kni;kk   ni;k  0 must hold. Furthermore, in any equilibrium with positive R&D
10The reason why  must be lower than one is that rational investors, being aware of the existence
of insiders who hold superior information, will not be willing to trade derivative assets. (This would
e¤ectively amount to bet against informed bettors, which can never be protable.) As a result,
insiders can never obtain more than the total change in the value of the asset.
11Speculation is typically much faster than innovation. Inside information can hardly be concealed
for more than a few weeks, whereas achieving an innovation may easily take many years.
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investment the condition must hold as an equality, which implies:
kk = 1:
Using the fact that k =  k and Pk = kp, the zero-prot condition becomes:12
(   1)p = 1

: (4)
3.3 Equilibrium growth
From the asset price equation (3) and the zero prot condition (4), one determines
an increasing relationship between the interest rate and the rate of innovation:
r = (   1)(1  ) + (1  )(   1)x: (5)
The Euler equation provides another relationship:
r = + (   1)x: (6)
These two equations can be solved simultaneously to determine the equilibrium in-
terest rate and the rate of innovation. This immediately leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium rate of innovation x is positive if and only if
 >  =

(1  )(   1) : (7)
When condition (7) holds, the equilibrium rate of innovation and rate of interest are:
x = (1  )  
(   1) (8)
r = (   1)(1  ) 

1  


: (9)
Condition (7) follows from the fact that rms will invest in R&D only if, when
x = 0, the returns exceed the cost, which is one. When the rate of innovative activity
x is zero, there is no growth and hence the interest rate coincides with the rate of
12With constant returns to research, the equilibrium number of research rms and individual R&D
investments are indeterminate, and only aggregate R&D investment is determinate.
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time preference . An innovation would then increase the price of the irreproducible
asset by an amount equal to ( 1)(1 )=, of which the inventor obtains a fraction
. Therefore, the return to R&D is (   1)(1   )=. Comparing it to the unit
cost, condition (7) follows.
Condition (7) says that for persistent growth to be sustainable, it is necessary
that inventors obtain at least a minimum fraction  of the pecuniary e¤ects of the
innovation, Pk+1   Pk. The minimum threshold  depends on parameters ; ; and
=. Those are, therefore, the parameters to be gauged in order to get a sense of how
large  must be for growth to be sustainable.
Following Prescott (1986), labours share in national income, , may be taken to
be approximately 23 (to be precise, Prescott sets it at 0.64). As for , Stokey (1995)
observes that if innovations occur every few years, a reasonable value for  can be
1.05 or even less; if instead innovations occur only a couple of times per century,
then reasonable values for  can be as large as 1.25 or 1.5. We therefore let  range
in the interval [1:05; 1:5]. Stokey (1995) provides also a calibration of the ratio =,
suggesting for it a possible range from 0.04 to 1.13
Note that the minimum threshold  increases with = and decreases with .
Therefore, using the intervals suggested by Stokey (1995), the lowest value of the
threshold  is 22% (to be precise, this value is obtained by setting  = 0:64,  = 1:5
and = = 0:04). This corresponds to top-left corner of the reasonable rectangle
in Figure 1 below. As one moves away from that corner, however, the minimum
threshold increases. In fact, the threshold exceeds one, meaning that speculative
prots alone cannot sustain growth, in a large portion of the reasonable rectangle.
For example,  exceeds 1 when  and = are set at the center of the rectangle. This
suggests that while it is not impossible that speculative prots alone can sustain
persistent growth, the possibility may not seem very realistic.
13This range is quite wide. Furthermore, it has been obtained by calibrating a standard Schum-
peterian model. Therefore, it must be taken with extra caution when it is used in a model where
inventors are rewarded by means of an entirely di¤erent mechanism.
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r/l
1.05
0.04 1
Figure 1. In the dark red region, the minimum
threshold is lower than one.
Going back to the analytical solution of the model, observe that when condition
(7) holds rms have an incentive to invest in R&D at x = 0 as the returns to R&D
exceed the cost. In equilibrium, the rate of innovation x must then raise to the point
where the returns become equal to the cost.14
From Proposition 1 several comparative statics results immediately follow. Quite
intuitively, the rate of growth increases with the inventors ability to appropriate
speculative prots, . The rate of growth of the economy depends positively also on
the productivity of R&D expenditure, , and the size of innovations, , whereas it
depends negatively on the rate of time preferences . These latter e¤ects are natural
and are the same as in standard Schumpeterian models.
A novel result is that an increase in the income share of labour reduces growth.15
This follows from the fact that in an economy with no slavery only the fraction
14An increase in x indeed reduces the return to R&D, for the following reasons. As x increases, the
interest rate r must increase in order to satisfy the Euler condition. However, there is a countervailing
e¤ect: an increase in x increases expected future rents, raising the current price of the asset and
hence the size of the speculative prots. However, the slope of the zero-prot condition (5) is always
lower than that of the Euler condition (6), which implies that the former, negative e¤ect must prevail
over the latter.
15 In traditional Schumpeterian models, an increase in the income share of labour reduces the
elasticity of demand for innovative goods and hence increases the monopoly price. This allows
innovators to obtain higher monopoly rents and so stimulates growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
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(1 ) of the increase in total factor productivity is reected in changes in the prices
of tradeable assets. This implies that the greater is the income share of labour , the
more limited are the opportunities for speculative gains.
3.4 Insider trading
While a rigorous analysis of the inventors speculative strategy is beyond the scope
of this paper, at this point it may be useful to pause in order to briey discuss
the main problems that one would have to face in developing a fully microfounded
model of speculation. The rst di¢ culty is that in a general equilibrium framework
one cannot simply posit the existence of noise traders, as Kyle (1985) and many
subsequent papers do, but must model their behaviour explicitly. For example, one
could add a noise term to agents endowments, creating an insurance motive for
trading (as suggested by Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981). Alternatively, one could
assume that di¤erent traders have di¤erent discount rates, as in De Marzo and Du¢ e
(1999). However, these or other assumptions that may rationalize the existence of
noise traders would inevitably interact in non trivial ways with the delicate structure
of general equilibrium endogenous growth models.
Second, the existing literature on insider trading assumes that the inside infor-
mation becomes public at some exogenously pre-specied date. In our framework, in
contrast, the innovator may choose when to disclose the innovative knowledge to po-
tential users. Indeed, it is only when the new technology is put in the public domain
that the fundamental demand for the asset will change. Thus, the inventor must
choose optimally not only the trading strategy but also the timing of disclosure.
These choice problems are further complicated by the fact that with free entry in
the research sector, an inventor can never be sure to be the unique innovator, and
hence the sole possessor of the inside information. Somebody else might have already
innovated too, but might be concealing the innovation and secretly speculating.16
16Whether this is so cannot be perfectly inferred by observing the asset price, as if the asset price
was fully revealing, speculation would be impossible.
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With a Poisson discovery process, this possibility becomes more and more likely as
time passes.
This a¤ects not only the trading strategy, but also the optimal strategy of invest-
ment in research. Not knowing whether anybody else has innovated yet, rms may
keep investing in R&D until the innovation is disclosed. However, the reward to suc-
cessful completion of the R&D project obviously depends on how many other rms
have already innovated, or will innovate before the innovation is disclosed. Since this
is uncertain but stochastically depends on time, the equilibrium R&D investment
strategy can no longer be stationary, but must depend on the time passed since the
start of the race.17
While these problems may not be insurmountable, they certainly complicate the
analysis. Therefore, our reduced-form model may be viewed as a useful means for a
preliminary analysis of important policy problems. For example, Hirshleifer claimed
that speculative prots provide a reward for inventors that may exceed the social
value of innovations, thereby leading to overinvestment in R&D. In the next two
sections we shall assess this claim.
It is important to note that using the reduced-form model for this purpose may
not entail any real loss of generality. For example, if overinvestment cannot occur
when  = 1, then it will not occur in any fully micro-founded model in which inventors
can only capture a fraction of the pecuniary e¤ects of innovations. Conversely, if in
our reduced-form model overinvestment can occur as soon as  > 0, then it should
also occur in any fully micro-founded model in which insider trading is protable.
4 The overinvestment hypothesis: perfect competition
There are in fact two versions of the overinvestment hypothesis, both advanced by
Hirshleifer: that overinvestment in research may occur even under perfect competi-
17For a discussion of some of the problems posed by non-stationary innovation races see e.g.
Doraszelski (2003)
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tion, or else that it can only in the presence of monopoly rents. In this section, we
address the rst version of the claim; the second will be analyzed in the next section.
Analytically, the question is whether the equilibrium rate of innovation x of our
baseline model, given by (8), can ever be greater than the socially optimal rate of
innovation. To answer this question, we must rst turn to the analysis of the social
optimum.
Since the only distortion in the perfectly competitive equilibrium is that the pri-
vate incentives to innovate may not be perfectly aligned with the social ones,18 the
social optimum just requires that an optimal share of income is invested in research.
The trade-o¤ is that an increase in the share of income invested in research makes
income grow more quickly, but reduces the share of income consumed. Since there
is no capital accumulation, the social problem is stationary. Therefore, the optimal
policy must be stationary. With a constant hazard rate x, total R&D expenditure is
n =
1Z
0
n(!)d! =
xy

:
We then have
c(t) =

1  x


y =

1  x


ex( 1)t:
Substituting into the utility function (1) one gets
u =
1
2
x(   1) + 1

ln

1  x


The optimal innovation rate is then found by maximizing u and is
x^ =   
(   1) ; (10)
provided that (   1) >  . (If this inequality is reversed, the optimal policy entails
zero R&D investment, so the economy stagnates indenitely.)
18 In the competitive equilibrium, there are no static distortions. In particular, while speculative
prots are similar to a capital tax on tradeable assets, this tax is not distortionary as the assets
are irreproducible.
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Comparing x^ in equation (10) with the equilibrium rate of innovation x in equa-
tion (8), one immediately sees that x < x^ even when  = 1. We may therefore
conclude:
Proposition 2 In the baseline model, there is always underinvestment in research.
This result can be easily understood by contrasting the social and private value of
innovations. The social value of innovation k is the discounted increase in total factor
productivity, (k   k 1)=r: The private value is the fraction  of the increase in the
price of the irreproducible asset. There are two reasons why the private value is
necessarily lower than the social value. First, inventors obtain only a share  of the
increase in the price of the irreproducible asset. Second, the increase in the price of
the asset is only a share (1  ) of the social value of the innovation. The remaining
share  translates into an increase in labour income, which cannot be captured by
speculators who trade the irreproducible asset.
One may wonder that the baseline model might underestimate the potential for
speculative gains. In particular, the model does not capture the redistributive e¤ects
of technical change discussed by Hirshleifer in his locomotive technology exam-
ple. A feature of that example is that there are various assets in the same industry
and innovations are asset specic, meaning that the occurrence of the innovation ap-
preciates certain assets but depreciates others. This amplies the opportunities for
speculation.
In the Appendix we modify the baseline model so as to capture these e¤ects,
allowing for changes in relative asset prices within an industry. However, we show that
not even in this modied model can investment in R&D be excessive when inventors
are rewarded by speculative prots only. Intuitively, the reason for this is that even in
the modied model asset prices are pinned down by market fundamentals. It seems
that for overinvestment to be possible, asset prices must be somehow disconnected
from fundamentals, as we shall discuss in the concluding section.
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5 The overinvestment hypothesis: patent protection
The second claim made by Hirshleifer is that overinvestment may occur when in-
ventors can benet from patent protection in addition to inside information. In
particular, after noting that a perfectly discriminating patent holder can capture the
entire social value of the innovation even without speculating, Hirshleifer argued that
[...] the perfectly discriminating patent holder [...] is in a position to reap specu-
lative prots, too; counting these as well, he would clearly be overcompensated.
(p. 572)
In this section we analyze this latter claim. To this purpose, we modify the base-
line model to allow for the possibility that imitation may be prevented by patent
protection. In such a model, inventors obtain monopoly rents. As argued by Hir-
shleifer, however, that does not deprive them of the possibility of speculating, too.
The issue, then, is whether inventors may be overcompensated when they cumulate
monopoly rents and speculative prots.
For sake of consistency, we continue to assume that innovators do not directly en-
gage in production. Now, however, we assume that they can license their proprietary
technology to competitive rms that produce the nal goods. The resulting revenue
is similar in nature to monopoly rents.19
A standard argument, based on the Arrow replacement e¤ect, implies that the
latest innovator does not conduct any research and hence is systematically replaced
by outsiders. Initially, we assume that di¤erent patents cannot be pooled together.
As a result, successive innovators must compete with each other. In particular, in
each period k the latest innovator faces competition from the penultimate innovator,
who stands ready to license his technology at a zero royalty rate. The latest innovator,
19 In fact nothing changes if we assume that innovators directly engage in production, under the
standard assumption of Bertrand competition among producers.
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who can license the most productive technology, will then charge a royalty of:20
'k = 1 
1

(11)
per unit of output, obtaining an aggregate prot of k   k 1. This prot ow lasts
until the next innovation arrives. Therefore, the discounted value of the rents accruing
to innovator k is 
k k 1
r+x .
In addition, the innovator can also obtain speculative prots. With patent pro-
tection, the wage rate and the rents obtained by the irreproducible asset become
wk = 
k 1 and Rk = (1   )k 1, respectively: Thus, each factor is rewarded as if
the technology of vintage k   1, instead of the state-of-the-art technology of vintage
k, were used. Relative to the baseline model, rents, and hence the equilibrium price
of the asset, are scaled down by a factor 1=. Speculative gains are then scaled down
by a factor 1=, too. Thus, patent protection provides monopoly rents, but crowds
out speculative prots a trade-o¤ that we shall elaborate on later.21
Inventor k will then obtain speculative prots  (
k k 1)
 p, where the growth-
adjusted asset price p is still given by the asset price equation (3). The total dis-
counted prots accruing to innovator k are therefore
k =

k   k 1
 1
r + x
+


p

: (12)
In this expression, the rst term captures monopoly rents and the second speculative
prots.
We now show that the possibility of cumulating these two sources of reward opens
up the possibility of overinvestment in R&D. The free entry condition kk = 1
20To understand this formula, notice that the net output of a perfectly competitive rm that
licenses the state-of-the-art technology is
kLT 1   

1  1


kLT 1  = k 1LT 1 ;
i.e., the same as if the rm used the technology of vintage k   1, which is less productive but does
not command any royalty.
21The possibility of a trade-o¤ between patents and speculative prots was hinted at by Duggan
(1995).
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becomes: 
1  1


1
r + x
+


p

=
1

: (13)
The equilibrium rate of innovation will be positive if the left-hand side of this equa-
tion, evaluated at x = 0, exceeds the right-hand side. Since at x = 0 the asset price
is p = (1 )r and the interest rate r coincides with the rate of time preference , the
equilibrium rate of innovation will be positive if
(   1)

1 + 
(1  )


>


:
Comparing this condition with the condition for the socially optimal rate of innovation
to be positive, which is
(   1) > 

;
one sees immediately that as soon as  > 0 the market equilibrium rate of innovation
can be positive for parameter values for which the socially optimal rate is zero. This
su¢ ces to prove the possibility of overinvestment. We can therefore conclude:
Proposition 3 With patent protection, as soon as inventors obtain some speculative
prots, the market equilibrium rate of innovation may exceed the socially optimal rate
of innovation.
Since, as noted above, patent protection crowds out speculative gains, this result is
less obvious than it might seem. Consider, for instance, Hirshleifers argument that
a perfectly discriminating patent holder can capture the entire social value of the
innovation without speculating, and therefore must necessarily be overcompensated
as soon as he can also obtain some speculative prots. In fact, if patent holders could
capture, by means of monopoly rents, the entire productivity improvement, then
asset prices would not change at all as innovations arrive, and thus the opportunity
for speculation would vanish.
To better clarify this point, note that in the model analyzed so far the only
limit to patent protection is that a patent holders market power is destroyed by the
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occurrence of the next innovation in the jargon of the economics of patents, there
is no forward patent protection. To allow for such forward protection, let us now
assume that m successive patents can be consolidated into a patent pool. The patent
pool licenses the patents to the competitive rms operating in the product market,
and each patent holder in the pool obtains his marginal contribution to the pools
total prots. The model considered so far corresponds to the case m = 1. However,
by varying m one can capture di¤erent degrees of patent protection. The case of
perfect patent protection is obtained when m is innite. When m = 0, in contrast,
we are back to the perfect competition model with no patent protection at all.
The analysis is a straightforward generalization of that developed for the case
m = 1. In period k, innovator k m has just been excluded from the patent pool and
so must stand ready to license his technology at a zero royalty rate. The patent pool
will then charge an aggregate royalty rate per unit of output equal to 'k = 1  1m ,22
obtaining an aggregate prot of k   k m.23
We assume that each past innovator j who still participates in the patent pool ob-
tains a share of this aggregate prot equal to his marginal contribution, 
j   j 1 =  k   k m. When a new innovation arrives, each past innovators
share in the patent pools prots decreases, but total prots increase in such a way
that individual prot stays constant. However, after m successive innovations the
patent holder is excluded from the patent pool and his prots vanish. Thus, innova-
tor k obtains monopoly rents equal to
 
k   k 1 for m periods, which gives a total
discounted value of
 
k   k 1 1 ( xr+x)mr .
In addition, the innovator can also obtain speculative prots. Now, however, each
factor is rewarded as if the technology of period k  m, instead of the state-of-the-
art technology of period k, were used. Relative to the baseline model, rents, the
equilibrium price of the asset, and speculative gains are all scaled down by a factor
22The argument is similar to that presented in footnote 20.
23This formula applies as long as m < k. Otherwise, the royalty rate is 1  1
k
, as only the initial
technology, of period 0, is in the public domain.
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 m.
Thus, the total discounted prots accruing to innovator k are
k =

k   k 1
 1   xr+xm
r
+ 

k   k 1

 mp: (14)
Equation (14) shows that an increase inm increases monopoly rents (the rst term on
the right-hand side) but decreases speculative gains (the second term). The intuition
is that an increase in m prolongs the expected duration of the period over which
innovator k collects monopoly rents, not having been displaced by m subsequent
innovations yet. However, an increase in m also implies that monopoly rents are a
larger fraction of output and thus less is left to reward productive assets. Therefore,
an increase in m reduces asset prices, and hence also the speculative gains that
inventors can obtain.
In particular, with full patent protection (m = 1), monopoly rents are maxi-
mized: each innovator k obtains a permanent ow of prots of
 
k   k 1, which
equals the full social value of his innovation. However, such a fully protected patent
holder cannot obtain any speculative prots at all. The reason for this is that with
full patent protection all the productivity gains are reaped by the patent pool. As
a result, asset prices do not change when new innovations arrive. That is, specula-
tive prots are crowded out fully. Therefore, the innovator obtains exactly the social
value of his innovation: the equilibrium rate of innovation is just socially optimal,
not higher.
When m = 0, monopoly rents (i.e., the rst term in (14)) vanish and speculative
prots are largest. However, in this case we are back to the baseline model, where
the equilibrium rate of innovation is always lower than the socially optimal one.
As we have seen above, however, overinvestment in research may occur for inter-
mediate levels of patent protection, such as m = 1. The intuition is simple. When
m is nite, an inventors prots last for m periods only. However, when x is close to
zero, such periodsare in fact very long. Thus, as x approaches zero the inventor
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can actually capture the entire social value of his innovation by means of monopoly
rents. At the same time, however, should the next innovation arrive, the asset price
would jump up by a discrete amount. Anticipating this, inventors who can capture
a positive fraction of the change in asset price would have an excessive incentive to
invest in R&D.24
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a model of a perfectly competitive economy in which
inventors are rewarded by speculative prots only, formalizing an insight originally
due to Hirshleifer (1971). We have shown that even the steady, predictable ow of
innovations that is postulated in models of equilibrium growth may create, for a range
of parameter values, su¢ cient speculative opportunities to sustain persistent growth.
Using parameter values obtained from standard calibration exercises, the possibility
seems in fact rather unlikely; but this assessment is far from denitive.
We have also shown that in our model inventors rewarded by speculative gains
only are necessarily undercompensated. The reason for this is that the social value
of innovations is the total increase in factor productivity, which includes the increase
in the productivity of labour. Since labour cannot be the object of speculation, even
inventors who can exploit their inside information perfectly, capturing the pecuniary
e¤ects of their innovations fully, would obtain only a share of what they contributed
to society.
Things are di¤erent in an extended version of the model in which inventors can
simultaneously benet from inside information and patent protection. The analysis of
this extended model reveals a trade-o¤between monopoly rents and speculative gains:
strengthening patent protection increases the former, but decreases the latter. As a
result, the private incentive to innovate may be highest for intermediate degrees of
24While this mechanism may, at rst, sound reminiscent of the business stealing e¤ect (Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986), it is in fact di¤erent. Our model economy is perfectly competitive, and thus
incumbents do not earn any monopoly rent that can be transferred to new entrants.
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patent protection, and may then exceed the social incentive. In fact, overinvestment
in R&D is possible as soon as inventors obtain a positive share of the change in asset
prices that their innovations create.
This paper provides the rst formal model that captures Hirshleifers insight that
innovators can be rewarded by speculative prots. Being a rst attempt, the analysis
is preliminary in many respects. We have already mentioned the need for a fully
microfounded model of insider trading, and the issues that such a microfoundation
would raise. Equally important, our asset pricing equations are based on the no-
tion that prices are fully pinned down by market fundamentals. A recent nance-
growth literature has argued that new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive
investments which may amplify movements in asset prices, disconnecting them from
fundamentals.
This literature has been largely inspired by prominent episodes of market exuber-
ance, such as, for instance, the US telecom companiesdevelopment of ber-optic lines
in the mid-1990s, or the UK railway maniain the mid-1840s. In these episodes, it
became clear ex post that innovation had caused excessive movements in asset prices.
Various explanations have been proposed. For example, De Marzo et al. (2007)
argue that investments in new technologies generate positively skewed aggregate un-
certainty, which, combined with imperfect tradeability of future endowments, can
generate overinvestment and hence large asset price movements. In Angeletos et al.
(2012), entrepreneurs have access to imperfectly correlated private information on
the uncertain returns from their investments in a new technology. Overinvestment
here arises from the entrepreneurs incentive to correlate on high investments as a
signal of high expected returns.
Whatever the exact reason why asset price movements may be amplied, it is
clear that this should also amplify the opportunities for speculation. Re-assessing
Hirshleifers claims in a richer framework where asset prices may be disconnected
from fundamentals is an important task for future research.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we modify the baseline model so as to allow for changes in
relative asset prices within the same industry. This amplies the opportunities for
speculation. However, we show that even in this extended model there can never be
overinvestment in R&D when inventors are rewarded by speculative prots only.
1. Asset specic innovations
Assume that each industry ! comprises two sectors, indexed by v = 1; 2. In each
sector, the nal good is produced using labour and a sector-specic, irreproducible
asset. We normalize the supply of both assets to one and denote their prices by Pv;k
(where k still denotes the total number of innovations in the industry). The supply
of labour is xed and equal to one in each industry. However, labour can now freely
move across the two sectors of an industry.
In sector v, the production function is given by:
yv = 
hvLv (A.1)
where Lv is labour input and hv is a technological index that depends on the number
of past innovations. We now specify how this technological index is determined.
In each industry, the technological frontier corresponds to a total factor produc-
tivity equal to k, where k is the total number of past innovations occurred in the
industry. As in the baseline model, the variable k represents the industry-wide stock
of knowledge, which all subsequent innovations build on in a cumulative way. How-
ever, each innovation is now targeted to a specic asset, and hence to a specic sector
of the industry. That is, innovation k+1 raises total factor productivity to k+1 only
in the sector in which it occurs, leaving total productivity unchanged in the other
sector.
With these assumptions, the two sectors never share the same technology. In the
advanced sector, i.e. the sector where the latest innovation has occurred, we have
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hv = k. In the less advanced sector, by contrast, hv equals the latest period in which
an innovation occurred there. The technological gap between the two sectors depends
on whether sectors alternate in leading, or several innovations occur in a row in the
same sector. This is determined endogenously in equilibrium, as we shall see below.
The assumption that innovations are sector specic serves to generate changes
in relative asset prices. Since factor productivity increases only in the sector where
the innovation has occurred, labour ows from the less productive sector to the more
productive one. The rents in the advanced sector increase because of the increase
in productivity, and because of the inow of labour. The rents in the less advanced
sector, by contrast, decrease because of the outow of labour. These creates pecuniary
externalities that amplify the opportunities for speculative prots as compared to the
baseline model.
Like in the baseline model, we assume that the innovator can use his inside in-
formation about the arrival of the innovation to capture a share  of the increase
in the value of the irreproducible asset in the sector where the innovation occurred.
Let nv;k =
P
i ni;v;k denote aggregate R&D investment per unit of time in period
k targeted to sector v. Then, the k + 1-th innovation occurs in sector v according
to a Poisson process with a hazard rate xv;k = knv;k. We continue to assume that
k = 
 k.
2. Equilibrium
Research rms now choose both the level of the R&D investment and the sector they
target. While we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria, we focus on the
case where the opportunity for speculative prots are largest. Evidently, this requires
that all research is directed to the less advanced sector, so that in equilibrium the
sectors systematically alternate in leading.25 The following lemma guarantees the
existence of such an equilibrium:
25 If in equilibrium all research was directed to the leading sector, one would e¤ectively be back to
the baseline model.
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Lemma 1 There exists an equilibrium in which all research is targeted to the less
advanced sector: that is, xv;k = 0 whenever hv = k.
Proof. If research is directed to the more advanced sector, speculative prots are a
fraction  of (P2;k+1   P1;k) = (p2   p1)k, where p2 is the (growth adjusted) asset
price in a sector that leads by two steps. If instead research is directed to the less
advanced sector, speculative prots are a fraction  of (P1;k+1 P 1;k) = (p1 p 1)k.
It follows that the incentive to invest is the less advanced sector is greater than in
the advanced sector if
p2   p1 < p1   p 1: (A.2)
Thus, (A.2) is a su¢ cient condition for sectors to alternate in leading. To show
that this condition is indeed satised, we must determine p2. This, however, may in
turn depend on the asset price when a sector is leading by three, four or more steps.
In general, in a steady state asset prices are determined by the following arbitrage
conditions
rp1 = R1 + x1(1  )(p2   p1) + x 1(p 1   p1)
rp2 = R2 + x2(1  )(p3   p2) + x 2(p 1   p2)
:::
rpi = Ri + xi(1  )(pi+1   pi) + x i(p 1   pi)
:::
rp 1 = R 1 + x 1(1  )(p1   p 1) + x1(p 2   p 1)
rp 2 = R 2 + x 2(1  )(p1   p 2) + x2(p 3   p 2)
:::
rp i = R i + x i(1  )(p1   p i) + xi(p i 1   p i)
:::
where the index i denotes the number of innovative steps by which sector i is leading
(and, conversely, sector  i is lagging). The rents Ri are determined by the condition
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that the marginal productivity of labour must be equalized across sectors. This
implies
wi;k = 
kL 1i = 
(k i)L 1 i :
Together with the labour market clearing condition Li + L i = 1, this condition
yields:
Li =
i
1 + i
and L i =
1
1 + i
The rents then become:
Ri = (1  )

i
1 + i

R i =
(1  )
i

1
1 + i

:
To conrm that there is an equilibrium with xi = 0, we must consider out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. Assuming rational expectations, we consider a candidate equilib-
rium where x 1(= x) > 0 and x 2 > 0. (Values of x i for i > 2 are irrelevant.) In
this candidate equilibrium, the arbitrage conditions become:
rp1 = R1 + x 1(p 1   p1)
rp2 = R2 + x 2(p 1   p2)
rp 1 = R 1 + x 1(1  )(p1   p 1)
rp 2 = R 2 + x 2(1  )(p1   p 2): (A.3)
Since x 1 > 0 and x 2 > 0, the corresponding zero-prot conditions must hold
as equalities. Thus, we have
 (p1   p 1) = 1

(p1   p 2) = 1

;
which implies
p 1 = p 2:
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Because R 2 < R 1, for p 1 to equal p 2 it must be
x 2 > x 1:
To proceed, notice that the system (A.3) is recursive, as the asset price conditions
relative to p1 and p 1 are independent of the others. Notice also that p2 is a decreasing
function of x 2. Since in the candidate equilibrium x 2 cannot be lower than x 1,
a su¢ cient condition for inequality (A.2) to hold is that the inequality be satised
when x 2 = x 1.
Assuming that x 2 = x 1 = x, asset prices are
p1 =
R1 + xp 1
r + x
p2 =
R2 + xp 1
r + x
:
This can be rewritten as
p1 =
rp1 + x~p1
r + x
p2 =
rp2 + x~p2
r + x
;
where pi = Ri=r and ~pi = p 1. That is, pi is a weighted average of pi and ~pi, with
weights equal to r and x, respectively. Simple algebra shows that condition (A.2) is
satised when pi = pi, and it holds as an equality when pi = ~pi: Since pi is a weighted
average of pi and ~pi with strictly positive weights, and the inequality is linear, (A.2)
must always hold. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Intuitively, the change in asset prices is largest if the innovation occurs in the less
advanced sector, where innovation k+ 1 would raise total factor productivity by two
steps rather than one. With constant returns to scale in research, prot-maximizing
research rms will target the sector where the arrival of the innovation generates the
greatest change in asset prices. Since sectors alternate in leading, we shall henceforth
denote by 1 the more advanced sector and by -1 the less advanced one.
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Factor markets are perfectly competitive, so the wage rate equals the marginal
productivity of labour:
wk = 
kL 11 = 
(k 1)L 1 1 : (A.4)
The marginal productivity of labour is equalized across sectors at each point in time,
and the allocation of labour is e¢ cient. Together with the labour market clearing
condition L1 + L 1 = 1, equation (A.4) can be solved to yield:
L1 =

1 + 
and L 1 =
1
1 + 
where    11  > 1. Clearly, L1 > L 1. Since sectors alternate in leading, when a
new innovation occurs labour instantaneously ows to the sector where productivity
has increased.
The rents that accrue to the owners of the sector-specic assets are:
R1;k = (1  )


1 + 

k
R 1;k =
(1  )


1
1 + 

k: (A.5)
It can be shown that the rate of growth of the economy is still (   1)x.26
26Substituting the equilibrium labour inputs into the production function, one gets the equilibrium
outputs:
y1;k =


1 + 

k and y 1;k =

1
1 + 

k 1:
In each industry, total output
yk = y1;k + y 1;k
=

1
1 + 

 +
1


k
grows at rate    1 from one period to the next. Since there is a continuum of industries, however,
aggregate variables grow smoothly. Summing across industries, aggregate output is
Y =
1Z
0
yk(!; t)d!
=

1
1 + 

 +
1


G;
where G 
1R
0
k(!)d! is an average productivity index that increases over time with technical progress.
The rate of growth of output is the rate of growth of the average productivity index, G. To calculate
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Like in the baseline model, the return to asset v is the sum of the rents earned
by the asset plus any expected capital gain or loss. In equilibrium, the rate of return
must equal the interest rate r, implying:
rP1;k = R1;k + x(P 1;k+1   P1;k);
and
rP 1;k = R 1;k + x(1  )(P1;k+1   P 1;k);
since only a fraction (1   ) of the capital gain (P1;k+1   P 1;k) accrues to outside
investors; the remaining fraction  is the reward to the innovator.
In a steady state, the asset price equations become:
rp1 = R1 + x(p 1   p1)
rp 1 = R 1 + x(1  )(p1   p 1); (A.6)
where Ps;k  kps and Rs;k  Rsk, where ps and Rs are growth-adjusted prices and
rents, respectively, and s = 1; 1. These equations can be solved to express p1 and
p 1 as functions of x.
For future reference, we note that the occurrence of the innovation increases the
price of the asset used in the sector where productivity increases, but decreases that
of the other asset.
Lemma 2 P1;k+1 > P 1;k and P 1;k+1 < P1;k:
Proof. The rst part of the lemma is obvious, so it su¢ ces to show that p1 > p 1:
The system (A.6) is linear in p1 and p 1 and the matrix of coe¢ cients has full rank
(assuming that the transversality condition r > (   1)x holds, which is always true
it, notice that k(!) jumps up to the next higher integer with a constant instantaneous probability
x. Hence:
_G =
1Z
0
h
k(!)+1   k(!)
i
xd!
= (   1)xG:
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in equilibrium). Thus, the system implicitly denes p1 and p 1 as continuous and
di¤erentiable functions of x and r. The explicit expressions are:
p1 =
R1 [r + x(1 +    )]  (R1  R 1)x
r2 + (2  )rx  (2   1)(1  )x2
p 1 =
R1 [r + x(1 +    )]  (R1  R 1)(r + x)
r2 + (2  )rx  (2   1)(1  )x2 : (A.7)
Notice that p 1 is always increasing in x, and that p 1 increases with x more
rapidly than p1: Inequality p1 > p 1 must then hold for all values of x if it holds
when x is largest, i.e. the case  = 1. In this case, we have
p1 =
rR1 + xR 1
r(r + x)
p 1 =
R 1
r
;
so
p1   p 1 = rR1 + xR 1   (r + x)R 1
r(r + x)
=
R1   R 1
(r + x)
> 0;
where the inequality holds as R1 > R 1. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The speculative gains accruing to the k+1-th inventor are k = (P1;k+1 P 1;k),
or k = (p1   p 1)k: The zero-prot condition in innovation races then becomes
(p1   p 1) = 1: (A.7)
Since p1 and p 1 are a function of x, the zero-prot condition determines a rela-
tionship between the interest rate and the rate of innovation. Like in the baseline
model, the Euler equation provides another relationship, which together with the
zero-prot condition uniquely determines the equilibrium interest rate and the rate
of innovation.
Like in the baseline model, speculative prots can sustain innovation and growth.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the returns to R&D when no further
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innovation is anticipated exceed the unit cost of R&D. When x = 0, asset prices
reduce to p1 = R1= and p 1 = R 1=. Thus, growth can be sustained by speculative
prots if and only if

(R1  R 1)

>
1

: (A.8)
It is immediate to verify that condition (A.8) is weaker than condition (7), conrming
that the potential for speculation is higher in the two-asset model.
3. Comparison with social optimum
Now we are in a position to compare once again the market equilibrium with the
social optimum. Although the potential for speculation is higher than in the baseline
model, we still have:
Proposition 4 In the model with asset specic innovations, the market equilibrium
rate of innovation is always lower than the socially optimal rate.
Proof. It can be easily conrmed that the equilibrium rate of innovation is largest
when  = 1. In this case, the innovator captures all the increase in the value of the
asset that appreciates when the innovation arrives. Asset equilibrium prices then
become
p1 =
rR1 + xR 1
r(r + x)
p 1 =
R 1
r
:
Notice that the price of the less productive asset is independent of x and always equals
the discounted value of the rents R 1, as all future capital gains are appropriated by
the innovator. The price of the more productive asset, by contrast, decreases with
x. This follows from the fact that R1 > R 1. The intuitive reason is that holders
of the more productive asset su¤er a capital loss when the new innovation arrives
in the other sector, causing a reallocation of labour across sectors. It follows that
the incentive to innovate, p1   p 1; is now a decreasing function of x. Unlike the
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baseline model, the zero prot condition now determines the following relationship
between the interest rate r and the rate of innovation x:
x = r
(R1  R 1)  r
r   (2   1)R 1
: (A.9)
Over the relevant range, this is a decreasing function which is zero at r = (R1 R 1)
and tends to innity as r approaches (2   1)R 1. (From (A.5), it is easy to see
that (R1  R 1) > (2   1)R 1.)
The equilibrium is determined by the intersection between (A.9) and the Euler
equation (6). Since the Euler equation is increasing, and r cannot exceed (R1  
R 1), the equilibrium rate of innovation must satisfy:
x < 
R1  R 1
(   1)  

(   1) : (A.10)
This provides an upper bound on the equilibrium rate of innovation.
The socially optimal rate of innovation can be calculated proceeding as in the
baseline model. Optimality requires that the static allocative e¢ ciency condition
(A.4) holds. Clearly, the social planner will direct all the research to the less advanced
sector, where there is more to gain from innovating. Thus, along the optimal path
sectors will alternate in leading, as in the market equilibrium we have been focusing
on. The optimal resolution to the dynamic trade-o¤ between current and future
consumption lead to the following optimal rate of innovation:27
x^ = 
R1 +R 1
(1  )  

(   1) : (A.11)
We now prove that x < x^. From (A.10) and (A.11), it follows that a su¢ cient
condition for x < x^ is:
(; )  R1  R 1   R1 +R 1
1   (   1)  0:
27For simplicity, the calculation is based on the assumption that the initial conditions conform to
the steady state properties. That is, we have assumed that initially in each industry one sector has
a one-step technological lead over the other, as is always true in the steady state.
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Substituting for R1 and R 1; (; ) can be written as:
(; ) =  
 

1
1 
1 + 
1
1 
!
 
1
1 
h
(  1)  11    (  )
i
:
Thus, the su¢ cient condition becomes:
H(; ) = (  1)  11    (  )  0
Since H(; 1) = 0, the su¢ cient condition becomes H 0(; )  0. We calculate:
H 0(; ) =
 (2  )  11     1  + (1  )
1   :
This implies that a su¢ cient condition for x < x^ is thatK(; ) 
h
 (2  )  11     1  + (1  )
i

0. We have K(; 1) =  (1  )  0. Thus, the su¢ cient condition can be restated
as K 0(; )  0. Finally, we verify:
K 0(; ) =


1 
(1  )

(2  )   1  0
since 2    1 and  1 < 1:
The intuition is as follows. The reason why there is more scope for speculation
in the model with asset specic innovations is that the reallocation of labour across
sectors amplies changes in asset prices. Clearly, the e¤ect of labour reallocation
can be strong only if the income share of labour is large. However, when  is large
speculative prots must be small as compared to the social value of innovations.
Thus, the fact that the increase in the productivity of labour cannot be captured by
speculating on the tradeable asset still produces an underinvestment result.
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